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Abstract
We study the link between corruption and economic integration. Integration is mod-
eled by a common regulation for public procurement. We show that integration re-
solves a terms-of-trade-driven prisoner's dilemma and will always take place in the
absence of corruption. Corruption may destroy the incentives for integration. If the
propensities to corruption are too di®erent, the more honest country, which bene¯ts
less from integration, will not be willing to join the union. This di®erence in corruption
propensities can be o®set by a di®erence in e±ciency. We also show that integration
has the positive e®ect of reducing corruption.
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i1 Introduction
On the 28th of September 2000, the Danes rejected the Euro in a referendum (53% No, 47%
Yes). Given Denmark's monetary history of an 18-year ¯xed-rate currency policy (tied to the
Deutsch Mark and, since 1999, to the Euro), it is hard to believe that the Danes feared the Euro.
As Detnews.com on October 1st 2000 wrote: \........the real question was not the money, it was the
criterion and speed of European Integration". Indeed, a national survey held after the referendum
revealed that 37% of the no-voters favor less integration while 23% have a lack of con¯dence in
the European institutions; 33% fear for the Danish identity (c.f. Bering (2000)).
Denmark's behavior shows that popular support for integration is not only a function of
economic calculations. Denmark has bene¯tted from being a member of the European Union
(EU). This is even believed by the Danish people themselves.1 Popular support for integration
also depends on the interplay between national and supranational politics. The Danish value their
political system, they have a well-functioning welfare state (social expenditure in 1995 exceeded
34% of the GDP) where corruption is basically inexistent. Therefore, the opportunity cost of the
Danish to transfer sovereignty to Europe is high.
This paper formalizes the idea that economic integration is more attractive for countries
with internal problems and little trust in their national government than for well-functioning
countries. We will use corruption to model these internal problems. Corruption is highly correlated
with other \bad country" variables, such as minimal accountability of political parties, a badly
functioning juridical system etc. Moreover, recent empirical studies con¯rm the negative e®ects
of corruption, especially on growth: corruption reduces the amount of private investment (Mauro
(1995)), the quality of public investment (Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)) and the investment in human
1In (Eurobarameter) public opinion surveys of the European Commision the Danish consistently belong to those
populations that give the most positive response to the question whether or not they believe their country to have
bene¯tted from being a member of the EU on average. In the survey which was collected at the same time as
the referendum on the Euro was held (Eurobarometer 54), 65% of the Danish believe to have bene¯tted from EU
membership while 23% believe not to have bene¯tted. Only Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg and Portugal gave a more
positive response to the bene¯t question. The percentage of people who believe their country bene¯ts from the EU
is 72% in Greece, 86% in Ireland, 70% in Luxembourg and 69% in Portugal. 14% in Greece, 6% in Ireland, 16% in
Luxembourg and 14% in Portugal believe that their country does not bene¯t from EU membership.
1capital (Mauro (1998)).
For the sake of tractability we will study a two country model and only allow for corruption in
public procurement.2 Public procurement is an important part of a country's economic activities
(between 10%¡20% of GDP in most industrial countries)3 and is a sector very prone to corruption:
usually the sums of money involved are very big and the government is often the only buyer;
asymmetric information makes favoritism di±cult to detect.
In our model, the citizens delegate to the government agent the responsibility to implement
public procurement contracts. The commodity or public project can either be bought from a
local ¯rm at a ¯xed price (sole-source procurement) or it can be purchased through international
competitive bidding. On the one hand, the competitive bidding decreases the expected purchase
cost. On the other hand, it involves a ¯xed organizational cost that is private information of the
government agent. Competitive bidding is optimal, if its organizational cost is low compared to
the size of the project. Fixed price purchase is otherwise optimal.4 However, our government agent
is self-interested and therefore corruptible. She might misrepresent these organizational costs and
favor a local producer in exchange for a bribe if this maximizes her revenue. The citizens, i.e.
the voters, decide the discretion of the government; they use the political system to control the
government through the determination of a threshold (the size of the public project above which
the government is obliged to organize international competitive bidding). The voters are both
taxpayers and shareholders of the domestic ¯rm. They are thus concerned both with taxes and
with pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm. They pay the same taxes but di®er in the amount of shares of
the domestic ¯rm they own. In this context, the median voter approach is valid and his choice
is implemented. Under this set of assumptions we show, that the higher a country's propensity
for corruption, the lower the discretion granted to government agents. This is intuitive, since the
2Rose-Ackerman's (1975) seminal paper on corruption also concentrated on public procurement.
3The cost of public projects administrated by the European Union is around 720 000 millons of Euros every
year, which corresponds to 11.5% of the GDP of the member states in 1994 and is equivalent to the economy of
Spain, Danemark and Belgium together.
4Various factors may justify choosing sole source procurement instead of competitive procurement. The admin-
istrative cost is lower, sole source procurement is faster and there might be positive strategic e®ects, e.g. repeated
sole source procurement might reduce moral hazard problems due to the threat of awarding future projects to
foreign ¯rms. For more details see Marshall et al. (1994) who moreover provide empirical evidence on the use of
sole source procurement in the private sector.
2cost of foregoing the private information of the government is lower for a more corrupt country.
If countries decide to form a union, they adopt a common legislation on procurement. In the
present context, the median voters of the countries negotiate a common threshold above which
each domestic government is obliged to organize a competitive bidding. This approach mimics
the existing legislation on public procurement in the European Union: the member countries are
obliged to use an international contest if the size of the public project exceeds the following limits:
200.000 Euros for service contracts and 5 million Euros for public works (for more details see the
Green Book of Public Contracting in the European Union).
In our model popular support for the union depends on both economic calculations and the
interplay between national and supranational politics. On the one hand, the economic union
helps to escape a terms of trade-driven prisoner's dilemma. As in the standard literature, domestic
governments only care about the pro¯t of the national ¯rms. This leads to protectionism imposing
a negative externality on the other countries. An economic union internalizes this externality. On
the other hand, the use of supranational policies to avoid protectionism also reduces the discretion
of domestic governments; the common threshold is lower than all individual thresholds. Lower
discretion leaves less room for corruption, hence is valued more by countries that have little trust
in their national government.
The above argument summarizes the main idea of the paper and also applies to more general
setups. Allowing for corruption in the private sector or political corruption would lead to similar
results. The union will favor competition (e.g. by limiting tari®s or by reducing government
subsidies to national ¯rms), thereby reducing the stake for corruption. This is all that is required
for our model to work, and is a feature not restricted to public procurement. Therefore, our
simpli¯cation to consider only public procurement does not seem very restrictive.
If there is no corruption, countries will always form a union in our model, since the union
helps to solve the terms of trade driven prisoner's dilemma. However, a di®erence in corruption
propensities can hinder union formation. The more corrupt country is more eager to establish
a low common level of discretion, since it is less costly for this country to ignore the private
3information of its government and its gains from trade are larger. In general, the new threshold
of discretion is more binding for the less corrupt country, which is now obliged to use competitive
procurement much more often than without the union. Therefore, the less corrupt country will
not join the union if the di®erence in corruption propensities between the two countries is too big.
However, this di®erence in corruption can be o®set by a di®erence in e±ciency, if the less corrupt
country has a technological advantage and therefore bene¯ts more from trade.
From this theoretical model we obtain two testable hypotheses: (i) the more corrupt country
will be more in favor of economic integration since it bene¯ts more from integration. (ii) the
willingness to accept new members into the union is decreasing in the level of corruption of the
potential new member. We test these hypotheses for the European Union using panel data. We use
the corruption perception index of Transparency International and the standard Eurobarometers
as our data-source for support of integration. The empirical results seem to be consistent with
the model; but we have to bare in mind that we only have few subjective data points available.
Our empirical results are therefore only indicative and future empirical research is called for. Our
model also suggests that corruption is higher in countries where domestic ¯rms are sheltered from
foreign competition. This hypothesis has already been tested empirically and has been con¯rmed
by Ades and Di Tella (1999).
Our model on corruption is related to the literature on favoritism in public procurement and
the literature on the formation of economic unions and preferential trade agreements. The ¯rst
paper explaining favoritism in public procurement is McAfee and McMillan (1989) using the
Myerson (1981) theory of optimal auctions. This theory shows that discrimination in favor of the
more disadvantaged bidders can promote competition. McAfee and McMillan (1989) argue that
if the domestic ¯rms are less e±cient, this theory directly leads to domestic favoritism. Branco
(1994) objected to this argument since it would imply some cases of favoritism towards less e±cient
foreign ¯rms which are not observed empirically. In his model a utilitarian government cares not
only about the procurement price but also about the pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm. The resulting
optimal procurement mechanism leads to favoritism towards domestic ¯rms. La®ont and Tirole
4(1991) relate favoritism with collusion. In their model the public project is characterized by its
quality and price. The principal delegates the control of quality to the agent. The agent can collude
with one ¯rm and misrepresent his information about the quality in favor of this ¯rm. If we assume
that collusion with the domestic ¯rm is most likely, this implies favoritism towards the domestic
¯rm. Using a similar model, Vagstad (1995) introduces a superprincipal (e.g. an economic union)
into a context where governments care about domestic pro¯ts, as in Branco (1994). As in our
model, the role of the superprincipal is to reduce favoritism in order to internalize the trade
externalities. The optimal policy of the superprincipal is to reduce the discretion of the domestic
government by lowering the weight of the private information of governments in the procurement
process. The contribution of our paper to this literature is to endogenize the existence of this
superprincipal.
Our paper shares with the literature on the formation of an economic union that the union
helps to escape a terms-of-trade-driven prisoner's dilemma.5 This paper shows that technological
di®erences on their own cannot destroy the incentives to form a union. However, di®erences in
corruption propensities may do so. To our knowledge, this negative aspect of corruption has not
been analyzed before. But, if a union is formed among potentially corrupt countries, the union
does not only increase trade but also helps to reduce corruption, although the reasons why the
union is formed are purely economical in our model. In contrast, some papers (e.g. Grossman
and Helpman (1995), Krishna (1997), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998)) also consider political
motives for the formation of preferential trade agreements. In those models the political pressure is
exerted by special interest groups that lobby for protection, i.e. try to avoid the country opening
up to trade. In those models trade agreements provide a way for the government to credibly
distance itself from the lobbies. This reduces the payments from the lobbies to the government,
which is similar to our model in which the union reduces bribe payments. Although we use the
term corruption, our model captures rent-seeking activities in general.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the general model is described
5For a nice literature review on preferential trade agreements see Bhagwati et al. (1998).
5and solved for the case of homogeneous ¯rms, i.e. both countries have access to the same pro-
duction technology. This section isolates the e®ects on the desirability of an economic union due
to di®erent propensities for corruption. Section 3 discusses the case of heterogeneous ¯rms and
shows how a di®erence in honesty can be compensated with a di®erence in e±ciency making the
formation of a union more feasible. Section 4 tests our theory for the European Union. Section 5
concludes. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
2 The model
We set up a simple two-country model to study the implication of corruption for the desir-
ability of an economic union. The countries are called A and B. There is one single ¯rm in each
country. The citizens (voters) delegate to their domestic government the responsibility to imple-
ment procurement contracts, which have to be fully ¯nanced by collecting taxes t from domestic




is determined by a random draw from the
distribution function g(q). Firm i 2 (A;B)'s total cost of contracting the project is ci(q) = ciq,
where ci 2 fc;cg is the marginal cost. Firm i has low marginal cost c with probability ®i and
high marginal cost c with probability 1 ¡ ®i. The price of the project depends on its cost and
the procurement process used by the government. The government can either buy the project
at the high-cost price cq from the domestic ¯rm or sell the project on the international market
by organizing a second-price auction. Competitive bidding decreases the expected purchase cost.
However, it involves a ¯xed organizational cost k; which is a random variable. This organizational
cost captures administrative costs, costs for publicity and costly delays. The exact organizational
cost depends on the type of the project: for example, delays are more costly, the more urgent
is the project. As in Auriol (1998) and Marshall et al. (1994) we assume that the exact cost of
organizing the auction is private information of the domestic government and will be low (k) with
probability ± and high (k) with probability 1 ¡ ±. We normalize q = 0 and k = 0; we refer to
k = k. This normalization is without loss of generality.
The government agent has to choose which procurement process to use. By assumption it is
6always cheaper to organize an auction for low organizational costs k.6 For high organizational
costs k it might be cheaper to simply award the project to the domestic ¯rm. The latter depends
on the size of the project. For very large projects competitive bidding is always cheapest. Voters
partially control the government's decision through the determination of a threshold q¤ on the size
of the public project beyond which competition on the international market is required. In other
words, for q > q¤, the government is obliged to organize the second-price auction. For q < q¤, the
government can choose between sole-source or competitive procurement. In the latter case, an
honest government agent will make optimal use of her private information and organizes an auction
if and only if the organizational cost is low.7 However, government o±cials are self-interested and
might not be honest if corruption maximizes their expected utility. If the organizational cost is
low k; a corrupt o±cial makes a take-it-or-leave-it bribe demand to the domestic ¯rm. If no bribe
is paid, the project goes to the second-price auction. If the bribe is paid, the corrupt o±cial
awards the project to the domestic ¯rm pretending that the cost of organizing the auction is
high k. In this case capture occurs.8 If a bribe demand is made, the government o±cial pays an
idiosyncratic cost ¯ which is uniformly distributed in each country with: ¯ v [0;¯i],where ¯i is
country speci¯c and a measure of social honesty of country i.
Voters use the political system to limit the discretion of the government. They are both tax-
payers and shareholders of the domestic ¯rm. They are thus concerned both with the taxes t
needed to ¯nance the cost of the procurement project and the pro¯ts ¦ of the domestic ¯rm.
They pay the same tax, but di®er in the proportion ¹ of shares of the domestic ¯rm they own.
6To simplify the presentation we assume that it is cheaper to organize the auction whenever k even for the smallest
project, i.e. ®
2 [c ¡ c]q ¸ k . Notice that this condition is trivially satis¯ed given the above normalizations.
7We refer to this decision as optimal because it maximizes the utility of the median voter as will be seen
later. This decision does not coincide with the decision a utilitarian social planner would implement nor does it
coincide with cost minimization. In other words, we assume that there is no con°ict of interests between an honest
government agent and the median voter.
8We do not consider the problem of distortion, i.e. the possibility that the government agent pretends that
organizational costs are low when they are high. Allowing for distortion would not a®ect the qualitative results
of the paper. Under distortion the government agent makes a bribe demand to the domestic ¯rm claiming low
organizational costs and threatens to organize an auction if the bribe is not paid. We do not think that this story
is convincing, since ex post organizational costs are observable once the auction has been organized. A high cost
auction would clearly indicate the attempt of distortion and could be punished. Without the possibility to carry out
the threat to organize the auction, the government agent does not have any bargaining power and cannot extract
any bribe from the domestic ¯rm.
7The possession of shares can be interpreted more widely as a measure of how much a citizen is
directly a®ected by the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm. For example, some citizens are employers
or employees of the domestic ¯rm while others are politicians or government agents. We assume
that voters are uniformly distributed on a line segment: µi v U[0;1]. The location µi 2 [0;1] of
voters determines the number of shares of the domestic ¯rm they own. The distribution of shares
is linear and increases with voter's location, i.e. it is highest for µi = 1. Hence, there will be some
location µ such that all voters located at µi < µ have no shares and all voters µi > µ have
2(µi¡µ)
(1¡µ)2
shares. We assume that µ < 1
2. This implies that more than half of the population cares about
the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm. Under these assumptions the median voter approach is valid.
The median voter is located at µi = 1
2 > µ and therefore owns ¹M =
2(1
2¡µ)
(1¡µ)2 shares of the ¯rm.
Since ¹M < 1 always, the median voter cares more about the total cost of the project than the
pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm.
In the absence of an economic union, the median voter of each county chooses the level of
discretion of his own country by maximizing ¡t + ¹M¦D, where ¦D is the expected pro¯t of
the domestic ¯rm in its home country. If an economic union is formed, the median voters of the
two countries negotiate a common level of discretion for both countries. Any common level of
discretion that is e±cient and individually rational will be considered as a feasible outcome of the
negotiations.
We now summarize the time sequence of the model: In step 1, the discretion of the government
q¤ is determined through the political process. In step 2, nature chooses the characteristics of
the government agents, of the procurement project and of the ¯rms in each country. The size of
the procurement project qi becomes public information. ¯i and ki are private information of each
government and ci is the private information of each ¯rm. In step 3 (procurement stage), the
government has to procure the public project according to the contract law (level of discretion)
that was determined in step 1. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model. Only step 1 (the
political process) depends on whether or not a union is formed.
Introduce Figure 1: Timing of the Model around here
8The model will be solved by backward induction. First we have to determine the probability
of corruption, second the expected cost of the public project and, ¯nally, the discretion chosen in
a union and in the absence of a union.
The probability of corruption
Corruption can only arise when the size of the project is below the level of discretion q¤ granted
to the government and the cost of organizing the auction is low. For the sake of simplicity we
assume that the government has all the bargaining power and none of the surplus of corruption
is lost.9 The corrupt o±cial knows that a high cost ¯rm c cannot pay any positive bribe. He
will therefore ask for a bribe which makes the low cost ¯rm c indi®erent between rejecting or
accepting the bribe. The ex-ante (expected) pro¯t of the low cost ¯rm c if the bribe demand is
rejected equals its expected pro¯t in the second price auction, namely (1¡®j)[c¡c]q. If the ¯rm
were directly awarded the project (without any bribe demand) it would make pro¯ts [c¡c]q. The
di®erence between the latter and the expected pro¯t in the auction determines the bribe demand
which is ®j[c¡c]q. Given this bribe demand, a government o±cial will be honest (dishonest) if the
surplus from corruption is smaller (bigger) than his personal cost of being corrupt ¯. We assume
that the government has to incur this personal cost if a bribe demand is made, independently of
its being accepted. Hence for 8¯ < ®i®j[c¡c]q, corruption occurs, while for 8¯ > ®i®j[c¡c]q the
government o±cial will be honest.10 Using this cut-o® point and the fact that the distribution of




Notice that °i(q) is increasing in the size of the public project q and decreasing in the social level
of honesty ¯i of country i. We can also compute the aggregate probability of corruption ¡i given
9This assumption is not essential for the results of the model.
10We do not consider the possibility that the salary of the government agent depends on the total cost of the
public project, i.e. that the government agent can appropriate some of the cost savings implied by the optimal
procurement decision. Allowing for this possibility would obviously reduce the level of corruption but it does not
modify the qualitative results of the paper.













The higher the discretion threshold of the government q¤
i , the higher the aggregate probability
of corruption. A higher threshold level of discretion provides more opportunities for corruption.
Moreover, the stake for collusion is larger. Trivially, if both countries have a common discretion
threshold, the country with a higher level of social honesty ¯i will be less corrupt.
The procurement stage
We now characterize the expected cost of the procurement project. We distinguish two cases:
1. If q > q¤, the government has to organize a second price auction. The expected cost of the
project is:
(c ¡ ®i®j[c ¡ c])q + (1 ¡ ±)k:
The result of the auction will be a marginal price of c if and only if both ¯rms have low
cost. Therefore the expected price of the auction is (c ¡ ®i®j[c ¡ c])q. Additionally, the
government will have to pay the cost of organizing the auction.
2. If q < q¤, the government can choose whether to use competitive or sole source procurement
leading to the following expected cost of the project:
(1 ¡±)cq + ±[°i(q)c +(1 ¡ °i(q))(c ¡®i®j[c ¡ c])]q:
If organizing the auction is very costly, the project will be granted to the domestic ¯rm at a
price of cq. Otherwise, there is scope for corruption. With probability (1¡°i), the o±cial is
honest and the expected price of the auction is (c ¡ ®i®j[c ¡ c])q: With probability °i, the
o±cial is corrupt and always asks for a bribe resulting in a high price cq. If the domestic ¯rm
is low cost, the bribe will be paid; otherwise the project is auctioned on the international
market resulting in a high price since the domestic ¯rm is high cost.














[[c ¡ ®i®j[c ¡ c]]q + (1 ¡ ±)k]g(q)dq









where qM is the expected average size of the project.
This expression captures the main trade-o® faced by the median voter when choosing the level
of discretion q¤. On the one hand, a higher level of discretion increases the cost of corruption
(¯rst integral). On the other hand, it reduces the organizational costs (second integral).
We can also characterize the ex ante expected pro¯t of ¯rm i in country i, which we will refer
to as ¦D
















®i(1 ¡®j)[c ¡ c]qg(q)dq




(1 ¡ ±)®i®j[c ¡ c]qg(q)dq
¦D
i increases with the domestic level of discretion q¤
i , since the higher q¤
i , the more likely it is
that the project is awarded to the domestic ¯rm by sole-source procurement. Notice that ¦D
i is










®i(1 ¡ ®j)[c ¡ c]qg(q)dq




(1 ¡ ±)®i(1 ¡ ®j)[c ¡ c]qg(q)dq
¦F
i decreases with the foreign level of discretion q¤
j because international contests are less likely.
The choice of discretion
11This result is a direct consequence of our assumption that the corrupt government has all the bargaining power
and therefore appropriates all the surplus from corruption. This simplifying assumption does not a®ect the main
results of the paper.
11The level of discretion is chosen given the expected costs of the procurement stage and the
expected pro¯t of the ¯rms. We will now analyze the choice of q¤ in the absence of a union and
then move to the analysis in case a union is formed. For the time being, we assume that countries
may di®er in the social level of honesty ¯ but have access to the same production technology, i.e.
¯rms are homogeneous in the sense that ®i = ®j = ®. This simpli¯cation allows us to isolate the
e®ects of di®erent propensities for corruption on the desirability of an economic union. The case
of heterogeneous ¯rms will be analyzed in Section 4. Without loss of generality we assume that
¯A ¸ ¯B.
2.1 Homogeneous ¯rms without a union
In the absence of a union, each country votes for its own q¤ by maximizing the utility of the
median voter. The median voter, as a taxpayer, is concerned about the cost of the procurement
project and also about the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm, since he owns ¹M shares of the ¯rm.
Hereafter, we will write ¹ instead of ¹M for notational simplicity. We denote by Ui(qi;qj) =
¡ti(qi)+¹¦D
i (qi)+¹¦F
i (qj) the expected utility of the median voter in country i when the level
of discretion is qi in country i and qj in country j. In the absence of a union, the median voter
has no in°uence on the level of discretion in the foreign country and therefore takes it as given.



















i) = 0 (1)
It is easy to see that the problem is concave ( @2U
@q2
i
< 0). As a benchmark we will consider what
happens without corruption. Corruption will disappear if ¯ ! 1. The optimal level of discretion
without corruption q¤NC is just
q¤NC =
k
®2[c ¡ c](1 ¡ ¹)
:
12The level q¤NC is easily interpreted. ®2[c ¡ c](1 ¡ ¹)q¤NC is the expected saving for the median
voter in the procurement price if an auction is organized, while k is the cost of organizing the
auction. Therefore, for q > q¤NC it is always optimal to organize the auction, while for q < q¤NC
it is optimal to use sole-source procurement when the cost of organizing the auction is high. q¤NC
is increasing in the cost of organizing an auction. The level q¤NC is also increasing in the number
of shares ¹ the median voter owns, because the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm increase in the level
of discretion. The level q¤NC is decreasing in the e±ciency of ¯rms; the better the technology
(higher ®), the bigger the expected bene¯ts from organizing an auction, since it is more likely
that competition will reduce the procurement price.
We now come back to the general case with corruption where ¯ < 1. Using the implicit
function theorem it can be shown that the above comparative static results are also valid for q¤
i
implicitly de¯ned in equation (1). Proposition 1 shows how corruption a®ects the median voter's
choice of discretion.
Proposition 1 (i) The level of discretion with corruption is lower than without corruption.




Part (i) of Proposition 1 tells us that corruption has a shadow cost, namely the private
information of the government agent is not used optimally. This idea was nicely presented by
Ban¯eld (1975):
\[N]arrowing discretion [...] while preventing the agent from doing (corrupt) things
that are slightly injurious to the principal it may at the same time prevent him from
doing (non-corrupt) ones that would be very bene¯cial to him. If simply to prevent
corruption an agent is given a narrower discretion than would be optimal if there were
no corruption, whatever losses are occasioned by his having a sub-optimal breadth of
discretion must be counted as costs of preventing corruption."12
12Ban¯eld (1975), p. 590
13Part (ii) of Proposition 1 holds for a similar reason: the bigger the level of social honesty, the
bigger the opportunity cost to disregard the private information of the government concerning
the organizational cost of the auction and therefore the higher the discretion.
Proposition 1 does not tell us how social honesty a®ects the aggregate probability of corruption.
On the one hand, the more corrupt country ties its government's hands more ¯rmly and thereby
reduces its aggregate probability of corruption ¡i. On the other hand a lower level of social
honesty increases the aggregate probability of corruption ¡i. Which e®ect dominates, depends on
the exact distribution of g(q). Corollary 1 shows that if g(q) is uniform, a lower level of social
honesty implies a higher aggregate probability of corruption.
Corollary 1 If ¯A > ¯B and g(q) is uniform, then ¡B > ¡A.
2.2 An economic union with homogeneous ¯rms
If countries A and B form a union they ¯x a common maximum level of discretion13 q¤
U, which
is determined in bilateral negotiation. We consider any level of discretion q¤
U as a possible outcome
of the bilateral negotiation if it is feasible according to the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 1 q¤
U is a feasible outcome of the bilateral negotiation if it satis¯es the following two
conditions:
1. e±ciency:
there exists a ¾ 2 (0;1) such that q¤
U 2 argmaxf¾UA(qU;qU) + (1 ¡ ¾)UB(qU;qU)g





j) 8i;j 2 fA;Bg
De¯nition 1 states that the union should be e±cient and that no participant should be made
worse o® by joining the union. These requirements are satis¯ed by most bargaining schemes.
13This model ¯ts the case of the European Union very well (see introduction).
14Let q¤¤
i 2 argmaxfUi(q;q)g denote the ideal outcome of the negotiation concerning a joint
level of discretion for country i. q¤¤
i is the solution of the following problem:
max
q ¡ti + ¹(¦D
i + ¦F
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i ) = 0 (2)
Concavity is proved easily. As before, we ¯rst look at the benchmark case without corruption
(¯ ! 1) and its cut-o® point q¤¤NC
i ,which can be written as
q¤¤NC =
k




® < 1, q¤¤NC < q¤NC. When choosing a common level of discretion for both
countries the median voter has some in°uence on the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm abroad. The
typical negative trade externality when countries act in isolation is now internalized.
In this section we are assuming that the only di®erence between countries is their social level
of honesty. Hence, in the benchmark case without corruption both countries are identical and
both median voters would choose the same common level of discretion q¤¤NC. Therefore, there
is no con°ict of interest and the union will always be formed. The next proposition states this
result.
Proposition 2 (i) Without corruption (¯ ! 1) a union will always be formed.
(ii) The common level of discretion in the union is q¤¤NC.
With corruption (¯ < 1), there can be some con°ict of interest. Lemma 1 characterizes the
ideal level of discretion in a union for country i for the general case.





(iii) Let ¯A > ¯B. Then q¤¤
A > q¤¤
B : The higher the social level of honesty, the higher the ideal
level of common discretion.
15Since the median voter can a®ect the pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm abroad, he would choose a
lower level of discretion to bene¯t from increased possibilities of trade (Part (i) Lemma 1). This
ideal level of discretion is lower than the discretion in the absence of corruption due to the shadow
cost of corruption mentioned in Proposition 1 (Part (ii) Lemma 1). The ¯nal. part of Lemma
1 shows how di®erent levels of propensities towards corruption can cause a potential con°ict of
interest between countries. The more honest country would set a higher level of discretion, since
it is more costly for this country to disregard the private information of its government. Given
this potential con°ict of interest, a union might not be formed. To understand whether a union is
possible, Lemma 2 characterizes the necessary conditions for the possible outcomes of the bilateral
negotiations q¤
U according to De¯nition 1 and Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 For ¯A > ¯B any possible outcome q¤










The ¯rst condition is implied by the requirement of e±ciency in De¯nition 1. The second
condition is due to the participation constraint of the less corrupt country. If q¤
U > q¤
B, the less
corrupt country would not have any bene¯ts from trade if a union is formed, since country B
would not increase its openness towards trade. At the same time, country A would have to pay
the cost of reducing its discretion.
Since q¤
U < q¤
B Corollary 2 is immediate.
Corollary 2 The aggregate probability of corruption ¡i is lower in a union than without a union
in both countries and ¡A < ¡B for ¯A > ¯B.
The union promotes competition by decreasing the level of discretion of both governments.
This leaves less scope for corruption. Since the level of discretion is the same for both countries,
16the aggregate probability of corruption is smaller in the country with a higher level of social
honesty. The promotion of trade has the positive e®ect of reducing corruption. This suggests that
the union is more valuable for the country with a higher propensity for corruption. Proposition 3
states this result.
Proposition 3 If a union is created, the more corrupt country bene¯ts more than the less corrupt
country. Hence for ¯A > ¯B country B bene¯ts more than country A.
The reduction of discretion is more costly for a country that has more con¯dence in its gov-
ernment, since a lower level of discretion reduces the possibility of using the private information
of the government in an e±cient way. Moreover, the bene¯ts from increased competition (trade)
are larger for the more corrupt country because the reduction in discretion is larger for the less
corrupt country. (Recall that q¤
A > q¤
B.) Since the bene¯ts from increased trade are smaller for the
less corrupt country, they might not outweigh its cost of reducing the level of discretion. In this
case, the less corrupt country will not join the union. Proposition 4 characterizes the conditions
when this happens.
Proposition 4 For ¯A > ¯B there exists a ¯B
¤ < ¯A such that 8¯B < ¯B
¤ no union is possible.
In other words, if country B is too corrupt, country A will not agree to form a union.
The more corrupt country B is, the lower the level of discretion required for the formation of
an economic union. If country B is too corrupt, country A is better o® without a union: since the
level of discretion in country B is already low, the bene¯ts from trade are very small for country A
while the cost of ignoring the private information of its domestic government is large. Therefore
we can conclude that corruption can destroy the incentives to form a union. Nevertheless, we point
out that it is not the existence of corruption as such, but rather the di®erence in the propensity
of corruption that hinders the union formation. If both countries have the same propensity of
corruption, they would be identical in all respects and the union would always be formed, since
it would internalize the negative trade externality imposed by the choice of the median voters
17without a union. In the next section we analyze how these results change if countries also di®er
in another aspect, namely in the level of e±ciency of their ¯rms.
3 Heterogeneous firms
We come back to the more general model with heterogeneous ¯rms ®A 6= ®B. We introduce
the following parameterization for the cost di®erence with ! 2 (®; 1
®) being a constant.14










If ! > 1 country A is more e±cient than country B.
Lemma 3 With the parameterization (3) and (4), the di®erence in e±ciency between country A
and B does not a®ect their level of discretion chosen in the absence of a union.
In other words, the cost parameterization was chosen in such a way that, without a union
di®erences in the level of discretion, are solely caused by di®erences in corruption propensities.
This choice was made to facilitate comparison; the parameterization allows us to disentangle the
incentives for the union formation due to cost di®erences from the incentives due to di®erences in
levels of social honesty. We now proceed to characterizing the ideal point for a common level of
discretion of each country. Again, this ideal point q¤¤
®i 2 argmaxfUi(q;q)g is the solution to the
following maximization problem.
max
q ¡ti + ¹(¦D
i + ¦F
i )






















i ) = 0 (5)
14We do not consider ! = ® or ! = 1
® because the less e±cient country will not bene¯t from increased competition
(trade) with this parameters, i.e. no union will be possible.








The lower the level of e±ciency in country j, the lower the ideal point in country i. The more e±-
cient country wants more openness towards trade: its e±ciency advantage increases its probability
of winning the international competition. The same intuition holds with corruption if ¯A = ¯B.
Lemma 4 In the absence of corruption (¯i ! 1; ¯j ! 1) or if ¯A = ¯B, the more e±cient
country chooses a lower ideal point for the common level of discretion. If the union is formed, the
more e±cient country bene¯ts more from the union.
Without a union, both countries choose the same level of discretion. If a union is formed,
both countries can also in°uence the foreign pro¯ts of their domestic ¯rms, which induces them
to choose a lower level of discretion than in the absence of a union. Since the more e±cient
country is more likely to win the auction, it bene¯ts more if the level of discretion is reduced.
For the case of homogeneous ¯rms we have shown that if there is no con°ict of interest, either
because there is no corruption (Proposition 2 ) or because the propensities for corruption are the
same (Proposition 4), a union will always be formed. These results might appear to be the result
of the fact that without a con°ict of interest due to corruption countries were identical. In the
case of heterogeneous ¯rms there is always a potential for a con°ict of interest. Nevertheless,
Proposition 5 shows that di®erences in e±ciency do not hinder the union formation.
Proposition 5 In the absence of corruption (¯i ! 1; ¯j ! 1) or if ¯A = ¯B a union will be
formed for 8!.
The underlying intuition is the following. Any decrease in discretion is more bene¯cial for
the more e±cient country. The less e±cient country is willing to reduce discretion in the union
to some extent to internalize the negative trade externality. A union is always possible since the
more e±cient country prefers the less e±cient country's ideal point for the union to the status
19quo (no union). Hence, the potential con°ict of interest caused by di®erences in e±ciency does
not destroy incentives for integration. We will now examine what happens if countries also di®er
in their propensities towards corruption. We start by characterizing the countries' ideal outcomes
of bilateral negotiations.
Lemma 5 Let ¯A > ¯B .
(i) If ! < 1, q¤¤
B < q¤¤
A always.
(ii) If ! > 1 it is ambiguous which country chooses a lower cuto® point as its ideal outcome
of bilateral negotiations.
In part (i) of Lemma 5 the more corrupt country is also more e±cient. This country wants a
smaller joint level of discretion because it bene¯ts more from increased trade and is more willing
to disregard the private information of its government. The incentives to reduce discretion due
to the e±ciency advantage and due to corruption reinforce each other. In part (ii) of Lemma
5 the more corrupt country is less e±cient. Which country is more willing to reduce discretion
depends on the relative weights of the incentives to reduce discretion due to corruption and due
to e±ciency.
Compared to the case of homogenous ¯rms, if ! < 1 the con°ict of interest between the two
countries is aggravated. If ! > 1 the con°ict of interest is mitigated since the country that is more
reluctant to reduce discretion (the less corrupt country) bene¯ts more from trade. Proposition 6
extends Proposition 4 to the case of heterogeneous ¯rms, and shows that di®erences in e±ciency
complicate the union formation if ! < 1 and facilitate the union formation if ! > 1.
Proposition 6 For ¯A > ¯B there exists a ¯B
¤
(!) < ¯A such that 8¯B < ¯B
¤
(!) no union is
possible. ¯B
¤(!) decreases if ! increases.
The more e±cient country A is, the higher are its bene¯ts from increased trade. These
increased gains from trade allow country A to accept higher corruption in the partner country. In
other words, a di®erence in honesty can be compensated by a di®erence in e±ciency increasing
the set of parameters for which a union is possible.
20Technological di®erences between countries may produce a con°ict of interest related to the
choice of the common procurement legislation but they do not destroy the incentives to form a
union. In contrast, di®erences in propensities of corruption can hinder the union formation. If,
however, the less corrupt country is more e±cient the union formation is more likely compared to
the case in which ¯rms are homogeneous.
4 Empirical Evidence
The following two testable hypotheses can be derived from our theory:
Hypothesis 1 More corrupt countries are more favorable towards integration.
Hypothesis 2 The more corrupt a country, the less acceptable its membership in the union.
We will test these hypotheses for the case of the European Union. We will ¯rst describe our
data sources, then justify the econometric model we use and ¯nally report the regression results.
4.1 Data sources
Corruption
We use the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indices (CPI) as a measure
for the degree of corruption. The index ranges between 10 (clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). CPI is
based on di®erent surveys that measure corruption within countries by gathering data about the
subjective perception of corruption (for details see e.g. Lambsdor® (1999)).15 For a country to be
included in CPI, at least 3 di®erent reliable surveys are required. Given that some surveys are not
updated every year and new reliable surveys are created, the basket of surveys used to calculate
CPI is continuously changing. Since the sources show a high degree of correlation, the impact
of changes in surveys used (which implies changes in samples and methodologies) on outcomes
15Notice that our theoretical model excludes the possibility of bribing in other country and therefore requires a
measure for corruption that excludes bribery in foreign countries. The degree of corruption practiced by nationals
outside their country is not included in CPI.
21seems to be small. The composite index CPI is derived by standardizing each of the sources and
assigning equal weights to all sources included in the index. Typically, these sources are based on
the following two de¯nitions of the degree of corruption (see Lambsdor® (1999)): (i) the frequency
of corrupt acts and (ii) the amount of bribes paid. Although theoretically these measures could
be very di®erent, the high correlation between surveys using the two di®erent de¯nitions suggests
that these measures turn out to be very similar in practice. In general, the correlation between
sources tends to lie above 0.8 (see Lambsdor® (1999)). By combining di®erent data sources into a
single index, CPI lowers the probability of misrepresenting a country considerably. As a measure
for the reliability of each country's score, CPI includes the standard deviation (variance) ¾ of each
score and the number n of sources used in the calculation. This allows to calculate a proxy for





In Appendix B.1 this proxy (SE) and CPI is reported for the countries of the European Union
for 1995-1997 which is the period we analyze. Belgium and Luxembourg will be excluded from
our regression since CPI did not separate these two countries before 1997.16
ProEuropeanness
Our data source for ProEuropeanness are the Standard Eurobarometer surveys. These public
opinion surveys are conducted on behalf of the European Commission twice a year. The regular
sample size is 1000 people per country aged ¯fteen years and over.17 While a set of identical
questions is asked in each Member State in each survey, the set of questions di®er with di®erent
surveys. The following two questions are of interest for our theoretical model:
1. (the second question of) the socalled Eurodynamometer, namely: \Which (speed of Euro-
pean Uni¯cation) corresponds best to what you would like?"
16The index di®ers considerably for both countries when separate indices are available.
17Exceptions are Germany (1000 in former East and 1000 in former West Germany) and UK (1000 in Britain
and 300 in Northern Ireland).
22Responses can be graduated from 1=standstill to 7=as fast as possible.
2. support for enlargement of the European Union: \For each of the following countries are
you in favor or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?"
Three answers are possible (i) in favor, (ii) against, (iii) don't know.
Questions 1 addresses each country's support for the European Union and therefore is a mea-
sure for ProEuropeanness (hypothesis 1).18 Evidence for our theory would be found, if more
corruption implied more ProEuropeanness. Question 2 addresses the acceptability of a new coun-
try. Our theory predicts, that a country is more acceptable on average, the less corrupt the
country (hypothesis 2).
Other Variables of Interest
It is obvious, that the level of proEuropeanness of a country is not only determined by its
level of corruption. However, we are not interested in providing a full model that captures all
potential relevant variables; we would only like to examine our two hypotheses. Hence, we are
mainly interested in the sign and signi¯cance of the regression parameters and not in obtaining
a high R2. To exclude a variable that in°uences a country's attitude towards integration from
the regression will only be problematic for testing our hypotheses if this variable is caused by a
third variable that also a®ects the level of corruption. To avoid these potential problems we also
consider transfers to and from the union and log GDP per capita (in Ecus or in purchasing power
standards (PPS)). The underlying data is taken from Eurostat 2000.
18Alternatively we could have used the membership question as a measure for ProEuropeanness. This question
asks: \Generally speaking, do you think that (our country's) membership of the European Union is....?" Four
answers are possible: (i) a good thing, (ii) a bad thing. (iii) neither good not bad, (iv) don't know.
We chose to use the Eurodynameter and not the membership question because the former is entirely quantitative
and easily interpreted. With the membership question it is not clear what the exact measure of ProEuropeanness
is: is it the percentage of people who think that membership is a good thing or is it the di®erence of people who
like and people who dislike membership? Also, the possibility to answer: \I don't know" leaves us with some data
that is di±cult to interpret. Given that it was also possible to answer that membership is neither good nor bad,
\I don't know" cannot be interpreted as indi®erence. Moreover, the Eurodynameter addresses integration, hence a
common legislation, directly which seems to be the more relevant question than membership per se for our study
on how domestic corruption a®ects the desire for integration.
234.2 The econometric model
We would like to consider the following equation:
yit = ®i + ¯0xit + "it
where there are K exogenous regressors in xit, not including the constant term, and ®i is an
individual (¯xed) e®ect, which is country-speci¯c and taken to be constant over time, t. ®i
measures in°uences on the degree of proEuropeanness beyond those captured by the regressors.
It captures for example historical reasons for being more or less favorable towards the European
Union.19 Our panel has too few time periods to be able to estimate ®i. Hence, we were faced
with two choices: (i) to estimate the regression in levels, in which case we would estimate
yit = ® +¯0xit + "it + (®i ¡ ®)
where ® ´ E(®i) and the error term becomes ´it = "it + (®i ¡ ®) or (ii) take ¯rst di®erences,
eliminating the ¯xed e®ects. Estimation in levels is problematic if the individual e®ects are
correlated with the regressors. But if E(xit(®i ¡ ®)) = 0 OLS is consistent. Estimating in
di®erences creates other complications, e.g. a lot of cross-sectional variation in the data may
be lost and measurement error biases magni¯ed. We choose to use OLS, i.e. to estimate the
model in levels for the following reasons: (i) a priori it seems that the e®ect on proEuropeanness
of ®i is not correlated with corruption. We cannot think of any variable omitted in the model
that explains both the deviations of ®i from its mean and the level of corruption. Hence, the
assumption E(xit´it) = 0 is reasonable. (ii) losing cross-sectional variation is a real concern in our
data. For each country the data typically varies very little from one year to another. (iii) Given
that our data for ProEuropeanness, support for enlargement and corruption are based on opinion
surveys, the data is not too reliable and we are likely to be in the situation where measurement
errors are magni¯ed when estimating in ¯rst di®erences. Moreover, there is a slight concern on
the comparability of the CPI over di®erent years since the surveys used to calculate the CPI vary
19Germany is a clear example for which historical reasons increase its overall enthusiasm for a European Union
since supporting integration is a signal for the desire for peace.
24every year. Hence, some of the variations in the CPI might simply be caused by the change in
the basket of surveys used to calculate the CPI, and this bias is worse in a regression in ¯rst
di®erences.20
4.3 Regression results
We run two sets of regressions with DPD98 for Gauss (Arellano and Bond (1998)). DPD98
has the nice feature that it can work with unbalanced panels.21 In both sets of regressions we will
use OLS. Given that our error terms will be serially correlated, since the ¯xed e®ect is captured
in the error term, we will use robust estimates (robust to heteroskedasticity).
The ¯rst set of regressions aims at testing hypothesis 1 (the more corrupt a country, the more
proEuropean it is). The second set aims at testing hypothesis 2 (the more corrupt a non-member
country, the less likely it is to be accepted in the union by the member countries). Given the few
data points available, the regression results should be taken as indicative only.
4.3.1 Explaining the level of ProEuropeanness We run a set of regressions in which
the dependent variable is each country's average Eurodynameter for the years 1995-1997 taken
from the Standard Eurobarometers 44, 46 and 48 (see Appendix B.2 for the underlying data). All
our regressions corroborate the prediction of our theory: the more corrupt a country, the more
favorable towards integration.
Our ¯rst regression uses only corruption and the constant ® as explanatory variables.
variable coe±cient t-statistic p-value
constant 6.8085 38.05 0.000
CPI -0.290774 -9.038 0.000
20To see this point, notice that the level of corruption we observe is true corruption plus a shock °it. Given the
nature of the data it is reasonable to assume that E(°it) = 0 and E(°it°i0t0) = 0 8i;t;i
0;t
0. For the sake of simplicity
assume that the only explanatory variable is corruption. Then our equation becomes: yit = ®+¯(xit+°it)+´it¡¯°it
where the new error term vit = ´it¡¯°it. Given the measurement error, the estimator in levels will be biased. The
bias depends on the relative variance between xit and °it. This ratio will be larger in ¯rst di®erences, since there
is positive serial dependence in xit but not in °it.
21This is crucial for our second set of regressions since the data on support of enlargement and corruption for
non-EU countries is very incomplete. The enlargement question is not asked in all Eurobarometers. Moreover, it is
not asked for the same set of possible new members.
25Regression 1: explanatory variables ® and CPI
R2 = 0:6112
To make sure that the omitted individual e®ect ®i¡ ® is not correlated with the regressors,
we run more regressions including two other variables that might in°uence the level of ProEuro-
peanness and corruption, namely log GDP per capita and transfers from the union. The second
regression adds transfers and log GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS), the latter
being replaced by log GDP in Ecus in the third regression.
variable coe±cient t-statistic p-value
constant 5.684895 1.273 0.203
CPI -0.259352 -6.142 0.000
transfer 1.003327 4.145 0.000
log GDP(PPS) 0.084292 0.177 0.860
Regression 2: explanatory variables ®, CPI, transfers and log GDP(PPS)
R2 = 0:6989
variable coe±cient t-statistic p-value
constant 10.0039 4.48 0.000
CPI -0.214 -3.707 0.0002
transfer 0.7146 2.1899 0.0285
log GDP(Ecu) -0.39031 -1.4927 0.1355
Regression 3: explanatory variables ®, CPI, transfers and log GDP(Ecus)
R2 = 0:712
Since log GDP is never signi¯cant,22 our fourth and ¯nal regression drops log GDP as an
explanatory variable.
variable coe±cient t-statistic p-value
constant 6.482002 33.08 0.000
CPI -0.255394 -8.58 0.000
transfer 0.974775 3.87 0.000
Regression 4: explanatory variables ®, CPI and transfers
R2 = 0:699
22If we regress the desired speed of integration on corruption and log GDP per capita only, the latter is signi¯cant
and our main result (negative highly signi¯cant coe±cient for CPI) is una®ected.
26All regressions con¯rm that CPI is negatively a®ects the desired speed of integration.23 Since a
higher CPI means less corruption, more corrupt countries are more favorable towards integration.24
4.3.2 Acceptability as a new member We will test hypothesis 2 in an unbalanced panel
for the period 1996-1999. The data for acceptability of new members (reported in Appendix
B.3) has 3 possible answers: (i) in favor, (ii) against and (iii) I don't know. In the following
analysis the percentage of \I don't know" will be ignored. Several regressions will be run where
the dependent variable is either (i), referred to as EU15+, (ii), referred to as EU15¡, or the
di®erence between (i) and (ii), referred to as EU15. We will use corruption and a constant term
as the only regressors.
A close look at the data reveals that in 1998 the EU countries were generally more in favor
of accepting new countries.25 That is why we run the regression with and without a dummy for
1998.
Dependent V. explanatory V. coe±cient t-statistic p-value
EU15+ constant 16.023876 7.28 0.0000
CPI 5.982781 15.81 0.0000
EU15¡ constant 54.667310 20.68 0.0000
CPI -4.575050 -11.78 0.0000
EU15 constant -38.863402 -7.94 0.0000
CPI 10.588555 13.89 0.0000
Including the year dummy for 1998 we get:26
23Due to the measurement error the coe±cient of CPI is upwards biased, i.e. it should be bigger in absolute terms
and even more signi¯cant. This is con¯rmed in regressions in which we control for the measurement error namely
by running separate regressions in instrumental variables for each year using as instruments CPI of the other years
(uncorrelated with the measurement error).
24Similar results are found in Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) in an OLS regression for 1995.
25There is no standard explanation for this. One reason might be that it became known which countries were
admitted into the Euro.
26Regressions with dummies for all years reveal that the other time dummies are insigni¯cant.
27explanatory V. coe±cient t-statistic p-value
EU15+ constant 12.433031 6.8 0.0000
CPI 6.389219 17.13 0.0000
1998(dummy) 6.030902 3.37 0.000748
EU15¡ constant 59.180956 28.48 0.0000
CPI -5.085937 -15.55 0.0000
1998(dummy) -7.580763 -5.21 0.0000
EU15 constant -47.050969 -11.98 0.0000
CPI 11.510282 16.655 0.0000
1998(dummy) 13.751192 4.235 0.000023
The regressions indicate that less corrupt countries have better chances to be admitted as
new members into the European Union. This is re°ected in both, the percentage in favor and
the percentage against. The less corrupt a country, the more people in the EU are in favor of
admitting the country into the union and the less people are against.
For 1999 we were also able to run a cross-country regression of the share of population in the
country x that favors admitting country y in the EU on the corruption gap between country x and
country y. As country x we used the EU countries and as country y: Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Switzerland., Norway
and Turkey. The result is consistent with our hypothesis 2: The bigger the corruption gap, the
smaller the proportion of people willing to admit the potential new entrant (the coe±cient on the
corruption gap is -2.2370 with a t-statistic of -2.862 and p-value 0.004. The regression has 180
degrees of freedom.).
5 Conclusion
Although corruption usually transcends the national level,27 theoretical research on corruption
has mainly concentrated on the domestic perspective. In the present paper we studied the link
between corruption and some aspects of trade, namely international public procurement. In
particular, we study the incentives of countries to form an economic union. In the absence of
a union, each country decides its own procurement law, ignoring the e®ect of this law on the
27International organizations have long recognized that corruption is a supranational problem: e.g. OECD
countries recently approved the \Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O±cials in International
Business Transactions".
28other country. When a union is formed, this externality is internalized, resulting in a lower level
of discretion for domestic governments. The reduction in discretion leads to a lower level of
corruption. Therefore, the promotion of trade has the positive e®ect of reducing corruption. This
positive e®ect is more valuable for the country with a higher propensity for corruption, which is
therefore the main supporter of the economic union. However, the more honest country will not
join a union if the propensities of corruption are too di®erent. On the one hand, the reduction in
discretion is more costly for the more honest country, where the government is trusted to make
the right decision. On the other hand, the status quo without a union is more favorable for the
more honest country (with more opportunities for trade), since the corrupt country chooses a
lower level of discretion and therefore is more open to trade. Therefore, corruption can hinder
the union formation.
If countries di®er not only in their propensities for corruption but also in their technological
capabilities, a big di®erence in propensities for corruption can be o®set by a di®erence in e±ciency,
making a union formation more likely. This result might be important, since in general less corrupt
countries tend to be more e±cient.
Our empirical analysis for the case of the European Union seems to be consistent with the
above results. It is left for future research to check whether or not the results carry over to other
existing economic unions. We expect this to be the case for Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay). Chile was a potential member of Mercosur, but did not want to join to keep its
discretion over trade policies with third countries. This attitude ¯ts very well with our theory
given the di®erence in corruption levels (CPI for 1999 Brazil: 4.1, Uruguay: 4.4, Argentina:3.0,
Paraguay:2.0 and Chile: 6.9).
In our empirical analysis we showed that more corrupt non-member countries are less ac-
ceptable as new members to the European Union. We did not study whether these non-member
countries would like to join the union because we do not have the necessary data. The Economist
(May 13th 2000) dedicated an article to this question with the following title that speaks for itself:
\Central Europe wants to join the EU........but the Swiss still have doubts." CPI reveals that
29Switzerland is by far less prone to corruption than countries in Central Europe (see appendix
B.3).
Many economic consequences of integration are achieved through political means. Common
legislation and supranational and intergovernmental institutions are political mechanisms that im-
ply changes to the political system of member states of an economic union, since some sovereignty
has to be transferred to the supranational level. Models of economic integration have mainly
focused on purely economical aspects. While our model clearly follows the instrumental approach
- support for integration is a function of its costs and bene¯ts - we also consider that countries
with better functioning political systems might be more reluctant to transfer sovereignty. To our
knowledge this is the ¯rst model to formalize this institutional hypothesis.
A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1











This conclude the proof since the case without corruption is equivalent to ¯ ! 1.
Proof of Corollary1




















. Subtracting the FOC of the medium voter (equation (1)) in country B divided by
g(q¤
B) from the FOC of the medium voter in country A divided by g(q¤
A) we obtain:


























Proof of Proposition 2
30In absence of corruption UA(qU;qU) = UB(qU;qU). q¤
U = q¤¤NC 2 argmaxfUi(qU;qU)g8i;j 2
fA;Bg satisfy trivially the two requirement to be a feasible outcome of the bilateral negotiation:
e±ciency and individual rationality.
1. q¤¤NC 2 argmaxf¾UA(q¤¤NC;q¤¤NC)+(1¡¾)UB(q¤¤NC;q¤¤NC)g is satis¯ed since UA(qU;qU) =
UB(qU;qU) and q¤¤NC 2 argmaxfUA(qU;qU)g:
2. Ui(q¤¤NC;q¤¤NC) ¸ Ui(q¤NC;q¤NC) 8i;j 2 fA;Bg is satis¯ed since UA(qU;qU) = UB(qU;qU)
and q¤¤NC 2 argmaxfUA(qU;qU)g:
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Immediate from comparing the ¯rst order condition of a union (equation (2)) with the FOC
in the absence of a union (equation (1)).





Proof of Lemma 2










¾¯A + (1 ¡ ¾)¯B
¯A¯B




+ (1 ¡ ±)k
¸
g(qU) = 0 (6)

































A 2 argmaxfUA(q;qB)g 8qB and UA(q;qB) decreases in
qB.
Proof of Corollary 2
Immediate given Lemma 2
31Proof of Proposition 3
By Lemma 2 we know that q¤
U < q¤









A): In order to do so we add and subtract UA(q¤
B;q¤
B) to the left hand side
of the inequality and UB(q¤
B;q¤






































(8) is immediate given q¤




B) < 0, and given






























U (1 ¡ ±)®(1 ¡ ®)[c ¡c]qg(q)dq









B) < 0 (10)
















[±(°A(q) ¡ °B(q))]®2[c ¡c]qg(q)dq
> 0 since °A(q) < °B(q)
This concludes the proof.
32Proof of Proposition 4
Given q¤
A 2 argmaxfUA(q;qB)g 8qB, and q¤¤
A 2 argmaxfUA(q;q)g we can de¯ne the following
cuto® point f qB for the level of discretion chosen in the domestic context by country B re°ecting
¯B :
UA(q¤





A ) is the maximum expected utility that the median voter of country A can
obtain by forming a union with B. Given that UA(q¤
A;qB) is decreasing in qB; if q¤
B < f qB, no union
can be formed; the union violates country A's participation constraint. De¯ne ¯B
¤ as the level
of social honesty of country B that results in q¤
B = f qB; where q¤





> 0, hence ¯B < ¯B
¤ implies q¤
B < f qB and therefore country A's participation
constraint is violated for 8¯B < ¯B
¤.
Proof of Lemma 3









+ ¹(1 ¡ ±)
¸
+ (1 ¡ ±)k
¸
g(q¤
i) = 0 (11)
Given (3) and (4), ®i®j = ®2, hence the FOC for heterogeneous ¯rms (equation (11)) is identical
to the FOC of homogeneous ¯rms (equation (1)) in the absence of a union.
Proof of Lemma 4
Without loss of generality let country A be more e±cient, i.e. ! > 1. Assume ¯A = ¯B. The
case without corruption (¯A ! 1 and ¯B ! 1) is just a special case of ¯A = ¯B.
(i) We will ¯rst show that the more e±cient country chooses a lower q¤¤
i . The FOC for the ideal
point of a common level of discretion for country i with heterogeneous ¯rms has been derived in
equation (5). Equation (5) for country A di®ers from equation (5) for country B in only one term:
we have to compare
(1¡®B)
®B = !¡®
® (country A) with
(1¡®A)
®A = 1¡!®
!® (country B). !¡®
® > 1¡!®
!® if
! > 1. Hence q¤¤
A < q¤¤
B




A) 8qU 2 [q¤¤
A ;q¤¤
B ];
i.e. the more e±cient country bene¯ts more from a union. To prove that country A bene¯ts more
33is equivalent to proving that







This holds if UA(q;q) ¡ UB(q;q) is decreasing in q since q¤
A = q¤
B for ¯A = ¯B and qU <
q¤
A = q¤
B (see equation (11)). Notice that
UA(q;q) ¡ UB(q;q) = cte ¡
Z q
0




which is obviously decreasing in q.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let ! > 1 and ¯A = ¯B. The case without corruption (¯A ! 1 and ¯B ! 1) is just a special
case of ¯A = ¯B. Since q¤¤
B 2 argmaxUB(q;q), it is the case that UB(q¤¤
B ;q¤¤
B ) > UB(q¤
B;q¤
A). This
and part (ii) of Lemma 4 implies that UA(q¤¤
B ;q¤¤
B ) > UA(q¤
A;q¤
B). Therefore, q¤¤
B is always a
possible outcome for qU.
Proof of Lemma 5
By lemma 1 if ®A = ®B and ¯A > ¯B, q¤¤
B < q¤¤
A . By lemma 5 if ¯A = ¯B the more e±cient
country chooses a lower q¤¤
i . If ! < 1, the two e®ects reinforce each other, hence q¤¤
B < q¤¤
A . If
! > 1 the two e®ects go into di®erent directions, therefore the ambiguity.
Proof of Proposition 6:


































®2 [c ¡ c]q
¯A
¶¸
















(1 ¡ ±)®2[c ¡ c]qg(q)dq > 0
34W = 0 de¯nes q¤
B which corresponds to a ¯B



























(1 ¡ ±)®[c ¡ c]qg(q)dq < 0


































B.1 Corruption in the EU
The following table summarizes the corruption perception index (source: Transparency Inter-
national) The corruption perception index varies between 0 and 10. The higher the index, the
less corrupt a country. Luxembourg is omitted.
1995 1996 1997
country CPI SE CPI SE CPI SE
A 7.13 0.35 7.59 0.29 7.61 0.38
B 5.25 0.81
D 8.14 0.46 8.27 0.33 8.23 0.28
DK 9.32 0.06 9.33 0.30 9.94 0.33
E 4.35 0.93 4.31 0.70 5.9 0.60
F 7.0 1.05 6.96 0.56 6.66 0.39
FIN 9.12 0.15 9.05 0.21 9.48 0.24
GR 4.04 0.74 3.42 0.82 5.35 0.70
I 2.99 1.52 5.01 0.98 5.03 0.64
IRL 8.57 0.45 8.45 0.30 8.28 0.55
NL 8.69 0.46 8.71 0.22 9.03 0.21
P 5.56 0.47 6.53 0.48 6.97 0.50
S 8.87 0.19 9.08 0.25 9.35 0.23
UK 8.57 0.24 8.44 0.20 8.22 0.53
35B.2 Eurodynameter
The Eurodynameter ranges from 1=stillstand to 7= as fast as possible. The table below
reports the country averages. The data is taken from the Standard Eurobarometer 44, 46, and
48.
integration
country 1995 1996 1997
A 3.95 4.73 4.56
B 4.59 4.47 4.42
D 4.28 4.03 4.1
DK 3.92 3.64 4.42
E 5.41 5.32 5.39
F 4.82 4.59 4.86
FIN 3.9 3.73 3.84
GR 5.7 5.41 5.59
I 5.63 5.54 5.58
IRL 5.1 5.0 4.88
NL 4.9 4.56 4.86
P 5.15 5.53 5.72
S 3.82 3.71 3.89
UK 4.41 3.85 3.51
B.3 Support for enlargement and corruption
We can also examine support for enlargement of the European union. Our theory predicts,
that the more corrupt the country that wants to be a new member, the less welcome it is, since
it is the more corrupt country that bene¯ts most.
1999 1998 1997 1996
CPI EU15 CPI EU15 CPI EU15 CPI EU15
Switzerland 8.9 70-13 8.9 8.61 72-12 8.76 72-14
Norway 8.9 70-12 9.0 8.92 69-13 8.87 70-15
Slovenia 6.0 32-42 39-35 34-39 34-43
Estonia 5.7 36-38 5.7 41-32 36-37 37-40
Hungary 5.2 46-31 5.0 53-24 5.18 49-28 4.86 51-30
Czech R. 4.6 40-35 4.8 48-28 5.2 43-33 5.37 44-36
Poland 4.2 43-35 4.6 49-29 5.08 46-33 5.57 49-33
Lithuania 3.8 35-39 41-33 35-37 37-40
Slovak R. 3.7 35-39 3.9 43-32 36-38 38-41
Turkey 3.6 29-47 3.4 3.21 32-45 3.54 36-44
Latvia 3.4 35-38 2.7 41-32 36-37 38-39
Bulgaria 3.3 35-40 2.9 42-33 37-37 37-42
Romania 3.3 33-43 3.0 39-37 3.44 35-42 38-42
The data for EU15 is taken from Eurobarometers 51, 49, 47, 45. The ¯rst value refers to
percentage in favor, the second refers to percentage against.
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